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THE CONFLICT OF VISIONS IN NFIB V. SEBELIUS
Jonathan H. Adler*
ABSTRACT
In 2010, few anticipated the fate of health care reform would rest with the
Supreme Court. Yet National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
emerged as a watershed case that could remake the constitutional landscape.
NFIB presented a conflict between two constitutional visions of federal power, and
the role of the courts in policing such limits – an unconstrained vision, under which
limits on federal power are enforced primarily through the political process, and
a constrained vision, under which constitutional limits on federal power are
enforced by the courts. The contrasting views of the constitutionality of the
individual mandate and the Medicaid expansion did not reflect different
applications of settled principles so much as allegiance to competing visions of
federal power. This essay details this conflict, its resolution by the NFIB, and
possible future implications.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2008, few anticipated that the fight over healthcare reform would lead to
One First Street. Then-Senator Barack Obama pledged to fix America’s “broken”
healthcare system and “make sure that we have a health care system that allows
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for everyone to have basic coverage.”1 The details of his proposed fix remained
somewhat opaque,2 but most assumed the fate of healthcare reform would be
decided in the halls of Congress, not the courts.3 Some raised constitutional
objections as the bills were being debated,4 but few anticipated that the underlying
constitutional questions would be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.5 Even after
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed into law in March 2010, many could
not fathom that it presented any challenging constitutional questions.6
1.
JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO
OBAMACARE 21 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2.
The evolution of then-Senator Obama’s healthcare proposals over the course of
the presidential campaign is summarized in BLACKMAN, supra note 1, at 12–29.
3. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was the Supreme
Court’s first decision concerning the ACA, but it is unlikely to be the last. At the time of this
writing, the Supreme Court had just ruled on a pair of challenges to the so-called contraception
mandate—and additional challenges to various aspects of the ACA and its implementation are
pending in federal court. See generally Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014); Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir.), reh’g en banc granted, judgment vacated
(2014); King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014); Jonathan H. Adler, The Future of Health
Care Reform Remains in Federal Court, in THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM IN THE
UNITED STATES (M. Schill & A. Malani eds., forthcoming).
4.
Some had even raised constitutional objections to a healthcare mandate far
earlier. See, e.g., David B. Rivkin, Jr., Health Care Reform v. The Founders, WALL ST. J., Sept.
29,
1993,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230364080457
7490971369614332; see also David E. Bernstein, Origins of Commerce Clause Objections to
the Individual Mandate, in A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
AND THE HEALTH CARE CASE 212, 212–13 (Trevor Burrus ed., 2013) [hereinafter CONSPIRACY].
5.
See
BLACKMAN, supra note 1, at 35 (“During the summer of 2009, beyond the
fields of the Tea Party, the constitutionality of the ACA went largely unquestioned.”); Mark A.
Hall, Health Care Reform—What Went Wrong on the Way to the Courthouse, 364 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 295, 295 (2011) (“Before health care reform was enacted, Democratic lawmakers and
most legal scholars were confident of its constitutionality.”).
6.
When asked whether the proposed healthcare reform law was constitutional at a
town hall meeting, Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi incredulously responded, “Are you
serious? Are you serious?” See BLACKMAN, supra note 1, at 37–38 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Hers was not an isolated view. As Professor David Hyman recounted, “[L]aw
professors were openly contemptuous of the suggestion that the ACA raised serious
constitutional issues.” David A. Hyman, The Supreme Court’s PPACA Decision: Something
Went Wrong on the Way to the Courthouse, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 243, 245 (2013); see
also James Rosen, Experts Say States’ Health Care Lawsuits Don’t Stand a Chance,
MCCLATCHY
DC
(Mar.
23,
2010),
http://www.mcclatchy
dc.com/2010/03/23/90934/states-lawsuits-not-likely-to.html (“[T]here are significant legal
hurdles in establishing the states’ standing to challenge the health-care law and in persuading
federal judges that it violates the Constitution.”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Healthcare: Is
“Mandatory Insurance” Unconstitutional?, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 2009), http:
//www.politico.com/arena/perm/Timothy_Stoltzfus_Jost_720E1BE2-3EFE-448A-A519-
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By 2012, opinions had changed.7 When National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius was argued before the U.S. Supreme Court that spring, it was
universally recognized as a watershed case that could remake the constitutional
landscape.8 At stake was a President’s signature domestic policy achievement—
arguably the most significant piece of social legislation enacted in almost 50
years—along with a vision of the Constitution, its limits on federal power, and the
role of the courts in policing those limits.9 The arguments levied against the ACA
“challenged th[e] basic constitutional consensus” of the post-New Deal framework
“with the most significant social welfare reform legislation in decades hanging in
the balance.”10
Yet the “basic constitutional consensus” was actually not much of a
consensus in that it was not universally accepted that Congress had free rein to
regulate as it saw fit. There was no question that prior Supreme Court decisions
had approved the dramatic expansion of federal power over the course of the 20th
century.11 Yet there was still substantial disagreement as to whether the Court’s
968F31212226.html [hereinafter Mandatory Insurance] (“You are correct to invite your
political experts to respond, because this is not a serious legal issue.”); see also Timothy S. Jost,
Pro & Con: State Lawsuits Won’t Succeed in Overturning the Individual Mandate, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1225, 1225 (2010) [hereinafter State Lawsuits] (“These challenges have no legal merit and
are a serious distraction from the real work that lies before the states.”). Some even suggested
that antimandate arguments were so frivolous that those pressing legal challenges should be
subject to sanctions. See Brian D. Galle, Why Tax Cheats Love the AG Suits Challenging Health
(Apr.
3,
2010),
Care
Reform,
PRAWFSBLAWG
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2010/04/why-tax-cheats-love-the-ag-suitschallenging-health-care-reform.html (“I fully expect the lawyers who sign the briefs to face a
motion for Rule 11 sanctions and, if they appeal to a federal court of appeals, for costs.”); see
also Simon Lazarus & Alan Morrison, Lawsuit Abuse, GOP Style, SLATE (May 5, 2010),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/05/la
wsuit_abuse_gop_style.html (emphasizing the frivolousness of constitutional claims brought
against “the new health care reform law”).
7.
See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, Supreme Court Arguments on the ACA—A Clash of Two
World Views, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1462, 1462 (2012).
8.
See id. (“Constitutional lawyers consider this to be the Court’s most important
case since Bush v. Gore, but for health policy it’s the case of the century.”).
9.
As Lawrence Solum would write later, the NFIB decision “destabilizes what we
can call the ‘constitutional gestalt’ regarding the meaning and implications of what is referred
to as the ‘New Deal Settlement.’” Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. NFIB Affects the
Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2013) (footnote omitted).
10.
See Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83,
83–84 (2012), See also Solum, supra note 9, at 3 (“Before NFIB, the consensus understanding
was that the New Deal and Warren Court cases had established a constitutional regime of
plenary and virtually unlimited national legislative power under the Commerce Clause . . . .”).
11.
See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125, 127–28 (1942) (citations
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decisions green-lighting the growth of government power had been correctly
decided,12 as well as whether meaningful constraints on federal power remained.13
Numerous cases in the preceding two decades presented the Court with
opportunities to extricate itself from the task of policing the limits of federal power,
but the Court had not taken them.14 While some believed questioning the
constitutionality of the ACA would require the courts “to jettison nearly two
centuries of settled constitutional law,”15 others saw the ACA as stepping beyond
the furthest reaches of federal power previously approved by the federal courts.16
omitted). But see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617–18 (2000) (citing United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995)).
12.
For example, several have argued that pre-New Deal jurisprudence was closer to
the original public meaning of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas,
J., concurring); see also Robert G. Natelson, The Legal Meaning of "Commerce" In the
Commerce Clause, 80 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 789, 799 (2006); Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of
the Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 848–49 (2003) (citing
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring)); Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of
the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 147 (2001) (“What has been established here is
that those who have claimed that the original meaning of the Commerce Clause was narrow are
right and their critics are wrong.”); Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1395 (1987) (“The term commerce in this commerce provision
does not carry with it the extensive baggage placed upon it by the better-known New Deal cases
concerning the commerce clause.”). But see Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1,
4 (2010) (“[F]idelity to original meaning does not require fidelity to the original expected
applications of text and principle.”). Similar critiques have been made about the Court’s
expansive spending power jurisprudence. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The General Welfare
Clause and the Public Trust: An Essay in Original Understanding, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4
(2003) [hereinafter Natelson, General Welfare Clause] (critiquing the interpretation that the
General Welfare Clause provides “a plenary grant of regulatory and spending power”); John C.
Eastman, Restoring the “General” to the General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63, 67
(2001).
13.
See Ilya Somin, The Myth of An Expert Consensus on the Constitutionality of an
Individual Health Insurance Mandate, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 22, 22.
14.
See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 737–38 (2006); Gonzales v.
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269–70 (2006); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25–33 (2005); Solid
Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001);
Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 857–59 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
617–19 (2000); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 146 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
730–31, 758–59 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47, 57–73 (1996); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–68; New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 166–69 (1992).
15.
See Open Letter, Over 100 Law Professors Agree on Affordable Care Act’s
Constitutionality,
available
at
https://www.acslaw.org/files/LegalScholars_He
althCare_Constitutional.pdf [hereinafter Open Letter].
16.
See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, In What Sense is the Personal Health Insurance
Mandate “Unconstitutional”?, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 38, 38 (discussing the
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The claims in NFIB did not threaten a settled constitutional order so much as
they presented a conflict between two constitutional visions of federal power. A
constrained vision that emphasized structural limits on federal authority, subject to
judicial enforcement, was presented in stark contrast with an unconstrained vision
that would leave Congress as the primary arbiter of its own authority, subject only
to political checks.17 Under the former, the Constitution was understood to contain
internal structural limits on the enumerated powers of the federal government,
which needed to be judicially enforced. Under the latter, the primary checks on
federal power were thought to be found not in the judiciary but in the political
process and the judgment of Congress, and constitutional limits on federal power
were to be found external from the enumerating clauses in other sources such as in
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.18 This conflict was not new.19
The proper scope of federal power has been a matter of debate since the nation’s
founding.20 Over time the terrain shifted, as did some of the contending coalitions,
but the battle continued.
The enactment of a requirement that all Americans purchase qualifying
health insurance raised the question anew and forced the Court to reconsider
questions that some thought were long settled.21 The Great Society was enacted at
a time when the dominant constitutional vision embraced expansive federal power.
In the wake of the New Deal, it was widely accepted that the national government
had ample constitutional authority to address national problems. The power to
regulate commerce among the several states had become the power to regulate all

“unprecedented nature of this claim of power by Congress.”).
17
On “constrained” versus “unconstrained” visions, see generally THOMAS SOWELL, A
CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES 9–35 (2007).
18.
See
John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1311, 1315–21 (1997). It is worth noting that such external limitations on federal power are
largely checks on government power at all levels. Thus, insofar as the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Bill of Rights are read to constrain the federal government, under current doctrine they
also constrain state and local governments. See id. at 1397–405.
19.
See
Metzger, supra note 10, at 83 (“This conflict over the federal government’s
proper role is, of course, not new; it has played out repeatedly over our nation’s past.”).
20. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819)
(observing that “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the federal
government by the Constitution “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as
long as our system shall exist.”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2577 (2012) (quoting the same passage from McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405).
21. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577 (“In this case we must again determine whether the
Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and individuals
believe it does not possess.”).
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manner of economic activities.22 Perhaps more significant for the Great Society,
the taxing and spending powers were recognized as vast sources of federal power
granting Congress the authority to provide a broad social safety net, redistribute
wealth, and induce state cooperation with federal programs.23 It appeared that
insofar as federal power was to be restrained, it would be by the political process,
not the courts. The constitutional challenges to the ACA confronted the prevailing
conception of federal power with an alternative constitutional vision. The
contrasting views of the constitutionality of the individual mandate and the
Medicaid expansion did not reflect different applications of settled principles so
much as an allegiance to competing principles.
Part II of this Article traces the vision of federal power under the Constitution
that had evolved by the time of the Great Society. This was a vision of broad
federal power constrained primarily, if not exclusively, by the political process.
This is not the only vision, however. Part III outlines the alternative vision
suggested by the Rehnquist Court’s “New Federalism” and embraced by the
ACA’s challengers. This vision emphasized the inherently limited nature of the
federal government’s enumerated powers and the need for judicial enforcement of
those limits. These two visions confronted one another in NFIB as described in
Part IV, and as explained in Part V, the more constrained vision of federal power
prevailed. Part VI then looks to the future and considers the implications of NFIB
for federal power going forward.

22.
As one federal judge quipped, the Commerce Clause was often treated like a
“Hey, you-can-do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause.” Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume
Nineteen, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 5 (1995); see also Ilya Somin, Does a Federal Mandate
Requiring the Purchase of Health Insurance Exceed Congress’s Powers Under the Commerce
Clause?, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 15, 15 (lamenting the fact that “Current Supreme
Court precedent allows Congress to regulate virtually anything that has even a remote
connection to interstate commerce.”).
23.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
The breadth of this power was made clear in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66
(1936), where the Court, resolving a longstanding debate over the scope of the
Spending Clause, determined that “the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of
public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative
power found in the Constitution.” Thus, objectives not thought to be within Article I's
“enumerated legislative fields,” may nevertheless be attained through the use of the
spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds.

Id. (citation omitted).
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II. THE VISION OF THE GREAT SOCIETY
The Constitution created a federal government of limited and enumerated
powers. As Chief Justice John Marshall explained in Marbury v. Madison, “The
powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”24 That the Constitution
expressly enumerates the federal government’s powers is, in itself, an indication
that these powers are inherently limited.25 But to say that the legislature’s powers
are limited is not sufficient to identify the scope of the limits.
For several decades after the Constitution was ratified, Congress was
relatively modest in its assertion of federal power, and the Supreme Court had little
occasion to address the scope of federal power. The power “[t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States”26 was used primarily to regulate interstate
commercial activity. Chief Justice Marshall proclaimed that the Commerce Clause
power, “like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised
to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in
the constitution.”27 Yet as expansive as the commerce power may be, it is not
without limits. In Chief Justice Marshall’s famous formulation, the enumeration of
powers in Article I, section 8 “presupposes something not enumerated.”28 The
power to regulate commerce, though broad, did not necessarily extend to all
economic activity. The identification of commerce “among the several states”
presupposed that some commerce—that occurring wholly within a single state—
was not included.29 Demarcating the precise boundary line at which federal power
ceased and state authority began was difficult, to be sure, but that did not mean
such a line did not, or should not, exist.

24.
25.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 176 (1803).
As the Court explained in Gibbons v. Ogden, “The enumeration presupposes
something not enumerated.” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824).
26.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
27.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
28.
Id. at 195.
29.
See id. at 194–95.
Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be restricted to
that commerce which concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one which
would probably have been selected to indicate the completely interior traffic of a State,
because it is not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular
classes of commerce, to which the power was to be extended, would not have been
made, had the intention been to extend the power to every description.

Id.
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At the time of the founding, Congress had relatively little to say about health
law, and throughout most of the nation’s history, questions of health and social
welfare were left to state and local governments.30 The issue of whether the federal
government had the power to impose quarantines—which became a pressing issue
when quarantine authority became necessary to control yellow fever—divided
Congress in 1796.31 After extensive debate, Congress concluded that such
authority rested properly in the states.32 Chief Justice Marshall endorsed this
conclusion in Gibbons v. Ogden when he affirmed that “[i]nspection laws,
quarantine laws, [and] health laws of every description” were within “that
immense mass of legislation . . . not surrendered to the general government.”33
Although, for a time, “quarantine authority remained firmly in the hands of
the states,” there would be pressure to expand the federal government’s role in
protecting public health.34 After a yellow fever epidemic in the 1870s, Congress
created the National Board of Health and gave it some quarantine authority35
despite the prohibitory language of Gibbons. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court
upheld a Louisiana law requiring inspections of ships traveling on the Mississippi
River as a component of local quarantine enforcement.36 By the turn of the century,
30.
Cf. Richard H. Leach, The Federal Role in the War on Poverty Program, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 18, 18 (1966) (“For most of American history, the federal government was
content to leave the relief of the distress caused by poverty to state and local units of
governments or to private welfare organizations.”).
31.
Carleton B. Chapman & John M. Talmadge, Historical and Political
Background of Federal Health Care Legislation, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 334, 334–35
(1970).
32.
Id. at 335 (citing Act of May 27, 1796, ch. 31, 1 Stat. 474); see DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD 1789–1801 227 (1999) (footnote
omitted) (“In the end a bill was enacted merely empowering the President to enforce state
quarantine laws; the result was yet another victory for states’ rights in the House.”).
33.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203.
34.
See Chapman & Talmadge, supra note 30, at 335.
35.
See id. at 337 (discussing the yellow fever epidemic beginning in the summer of
1878 that claimed the lives of “twenty to thirty thousand” and led Congress to pass “a bill to
create a National Board of Health, with supervisory quarantine authority,” which became law
on March 3, 1879).
36.
See Morgan’s S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 464 (1886).
[I]t may be conceded that whenever Congress shall undertake to provide for the
commercial cities of the United States a general system of quarantine, or shall confide
the execution of the details of such a system to a National Board of Health, or to local
boards, as may be found expedient, all State laws on the subject will be abrogated, at
least so far as the two are inconsistent. But, until this is done, the laws of the State on
the subject are valid.
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federal authority to quarantine was well cemented,37 but the federal government’s
role in health policy remained quite limited.
Throughout the late 19th and early 20th centuries, there was much dispute
over the proper scope of federal power. Many regulatory schemes enacted during
this period were expressly limited to interstate commerce.38 Over time, Congress
became more ambitious, and the Supreme Court eventually stepped aside.
Beginning in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel the Court began to uphold
the regulation of intrastate activities that had a “substantial relation” to interstate
commerce.39
The Supreme Court’s acquiescence to the expansion of federal power during
the New Deal seemed to resolve the debate over the proper scope of federal
power.40 In a series of decisions, the Court recognized what appeared to be a nearly
unlimited power over economic affairs.41 As the Court concluded in United States

Id.; see also Chapman & Talmadge, supra note 30, at 338 (noting that dicta in Morgan’s S.S.
Co. “virtually invited Congress to pass an effective quarantine law”).
37.
See Chapman & Talmadge, supra note 30, at 340 (pointing to the passage of a
quarantine law in 1893 in response to an overhyped cholera scare as the moment when “[t]he
federal government finally took over quarantine authority, partly because public fear of
epidemics made it politically feasible to do so, and partly because the political climate itself
was changing”).
38.
See, e.g., Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, § 2, 34 Stat. 768, 768 ("That the
introduction into any State or Territory or the District of Columbia from any other State or
Territory or the District of Columbia . . . of any article of food or drugs which is adulterated or
misbranded, within the meaning of this Act, is hereby prohibited . . . .”); Act of Sept. 1, 1916,
ch. 432, 39 Stat. 675, 675 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8819a) (“An Act To prevent interstate commerce
in the products of child labor, and for other purposes.”); Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, 28 Stat.
963, 963 (“An Act for the suppression of lottery traffic through national and interstate
commerce and the postal service subject to the jurisdiction and laws of the United States.”); Act
of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (“Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is
hereby declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, . . . shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”); Act
to Regulate Commerce, §§ 1, 11–12, 24 Stat. 379, 379–80 (1887) (creating the Interstate
Commerce Commission and setting forth that its authority to regulate common carriers only
extends to those common carriers that transport passengers or property in interstate commerce).
39.
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
40.
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE 105 (1991) (noting that after the
New Deal “[a] commitment to federalism . . . was no longer thought to require a constitutional
strategy that restrained the national government to a limited number of enumerated powers over
economic and social life”).
41.
See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 166 (1987)
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v. Darby, “regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional
prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce
Clause.”42 Although the Supreme Court had previously suggested that insurance
lay beyond the federal government’s reach—as insurance was not “commerce”43—
in 1944 the Court expressly concluded that the Commerce Clause power could be
used to authorize regulation of insurance company practices.44
Taken together, the New Deal Court’s decisions “recognized Congress’ large
authority to set the Nation’s course in the economic and social welfare realm.”45
Throughout these decisions the Supreme Court repeatedly reaffirmed the limited
scope of the Commerce Clause power.46 Yet it only honored these limitations in
the breach. As Justice William Rehnquist observed in 1981, “one could easily get
the sense from this Court’s opinions that the federal system exists only at the
sufferance of Congress.”47
Much of the Great Society was not enacted through Congress’s Commerce
Clause authority but through the powers to tax and spend. Article I, Section 8 of
the Constitution empowers Congress to “lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts,
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States.”48 At the time of the founding, there was substantial
debate as to the breadth of the power authorized by this Clause. James Madison,
for example, argued that the Clause only empowered Congress to pursue those
ends specifically identified in Article I.49 To Madison, the phrase “general welfare”
(noting the Court, in the late 1930s, suddenly recognized “virtually unlimited congressional
power to regulate business activities under the Commerce Clause”).
42.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
43.
See Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1869) (“Issuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”).
44.
See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 545 (1944) (refusing
“to narrow the scope of the federal power to regulate the activities of a great business carried
on back and forth across state lines” and upholding Congress’s power to regulate “the methods
by which interstate insurance companies do business”).
45.
Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2609 (2012) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
46.
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (“That
distinction between what is national and what is local in the activities of commerce is vital to
the maintenance of our federal system.”); see also Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968)
(“This Court has always recognized that the power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed,
has limits.”).
47.
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 308 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
48.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
49.
See Eastman, supra note 12.
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did not license Congress to pursue any end it thought was “in the best interest of
the nation.”50 That interpretation, in Madison’s view, would grant “Congress a
general power of legislation, instead of the defined and limited one hitherto
understood to belong to them.”51
James Madison’s position may have been more representative of the original
understanding,52 but it was not a consensus view. Alexander Hamilton contended
that there were few, if any, substantive limitations on the spending power.53 The
power to raise money was “plenary, and indefinite,” and the range of purposes for
which money could be spent “no less comprehensive,” so long as appropriations
were “made [to] be General and not local.”54 In Hamilton’s view, the Clause
conferred an independent and distinct power, not limited by the other affirmative
grants of power enumerated in Article I, Section 8.55
This debate, too, appeared to be resolved during the New Deal. In 1936, in
United States v. Butler, the Supreme Court explicitly embraced a Hamiltonian
interpretation of the spending power as “the correct one.”56 According to the Butler
Court, “the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for
public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the
Constitution.”57 Madison’s definition, on the other hand, was rejected in Butler
because it would reduce the enumeration of the taxing and spending power to a
“mere tautology.”58 Similarly, in Helvering v. Davis, the Court held that Congress
has broad discretion to determine whether a given incident of taxation or spending
50.
51.
52.

See id.
30 ANNALS OF CONG. 212 (1817).
See Natelson, General Welfare Clause, supra note 12, at 24 (discussing how
proposals that “would have granted Congress legislative authority without limit” were “quietly
laid aside” during the drafting of Congress’s enumerated powers); Eastman, supra note 12, at
66–67 (footnote omitted) (“Although some of the founders, most notably Alexander Hamilton,
expansively interpreted the clause in a way similar to the current understanding, most did not.”).
53.
See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (1791), reprinted in 2
THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 446, 446–47 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
54.
Id.
55.
See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (noting “Hamilton . . .
maintained the clause confers a power separate and distinct from those later enumerated, [and]
is not restricted in meaning by the grant of them”).
56.
Id. at 66. The Court also rejected the view that the Spending Clause grants an
independent power to pursue the general welfare apart from taxing and spending. Id. at 65–67;
see also David E. Engrail, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (1994) (“No one today
candidly denies that Hamilton’s view of the spending power was correct.”).
57.
Butler, 297 U.S. at 66.
58.
Id. at 65. The Court reasoned that “[t]hese words cannot be meaningless, else
they would not have been used.” Id.
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is within its power to pursue the general welfare.59 According to the Helvering
Court, “When money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of
welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress, not the states.”60
When Congress enacted the Social Security Act of 1935, there was some
question as to its constitutionality.61 Nonetheless, it passed Congress
overwhelmingly and was upheld by the Supreme Court in Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis.62 As interpreted by the Court, the spending power is not merely the power
to appropriate federal money for federal purposes. It is also the power to induce
private or state action by attaching conditions to the expenditure of federal
money.63 The Clause empowers Congress to impose conditions on the use of
federal funds “to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal
moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative
directives.”64
When President Lyndon Johnson proposed various programs through which
the federal government would play a greater role in the funding of healthcare for
seniors and vulnerable populations, relatively few constitutional objections were
raised.65 By 1950, many had concluded that the Supreme Court would uphold a
system of national health insurance if only it could be enacted by Congress.66
Decisions such as Helvering and Steward Machine Co. were “all but conclusive
authority in support of the power of Congress to enact health insurance.”67 By the
59.
See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937) (holding that the discretion
to determine when spending would help provide for the general welfare, and thus the discretion
to determine the constitutionality of that spending, “belongs to Congress, unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, [or] not an exercise of judgment”).
60.
Id. at 645.
61.
See COX, supra note 41, at 169–70 (discussing the reaction to Butler and
Roosevelt’s supporters’ “fears that the Court would also invalidate the Social Security Act”).
62.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588–98 (1937).
63.
See id. at 589 (“If Congress believed that the general welfare would better be
promoted by relief through local units than by the system then in vogue, the cooperating
localities ought not in all fairness to pay a second time.”).
64.
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980).
65.
Some conservative thinkers did raise constitutional objections, but these
objections were not particularly widespread. See, e.g., Will Herberg, The Great Society and the
American Constitution Tradition, MODERN AGE, Summer 1967, at 231, 231 (“The Great
Society, as concept and project, is fundamentally ultra vires for a constitutional government
such as ours.”).
66.
See, e.g., Oscar R. Ewing, National Health Insurance: A Reply, 36 A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 1950, at 199, 199 (March 1950) (“[T]here is little chance that the courts will strike down
national health insurance if it is enacted by Congress.”).
67.
Id. at 200 & n.6.
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1960s, the expansion of government power at all levels was largely a fait
accompli.68 Indeed, by some accounts, the Court’s decisions upholding Social
Security and the Wagner Labor Act left the “entire system of constitutional
interpretation touching the Federal System . . . in ruins.”69
While there was some opposition to President Johnson’s proposed expansion
of the welfare state, this opposition was largely expressed in political—rather than
constitutional—terms. Even those who were concerned that some of the proposals
would intrude too far into matters best left in the hands of state or local
governments largely made prudential arguments.70 In the years that followed, the
most serious constitutional challenges to Great Society programs came in the form
of due process or equal protection challenges, not frontal assaults on the power of
the federal government to enact the programs at all.71 After Johnson left office and
Congress turned to environmental legislation in line with what he had advocated,
the most serious constitutional questions raised surrounded the potential effect of
the Takings Clause on expansive federal regulation, not whether such laws would
extend beyond the power to regulate commerce among the states.72 Since then, the
68.
See Robert B. McKay, Taxing and Spending for the General Welfare: A Reply
to Mr. Nilsson, 48 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1962, at 38, 38 (“[I]t is sobering to observe that all government
in the United States has expanded enormously in this century, and at an accelerating rate.”).
69.
See Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 17
(1950).
70.
See Leach, supra note 29, at 35–36.
The Democratic Party has made the elimination of poverty an article of faith and has
pledged its efforts toward making sure that the federal government does whatever is
necessary to win the war against it. While the Republicans can hardly—and, indeed,
have not—come out against the objective of the war, they have been increasingly
astringent in their remarks about how the war is being waged. . . .
Whatever the outcome of the political battle over the conduct of the war on
poverty, it would seem to be a necessary conclusion from even a cursory study of the
problem it is attacking that, if the war is finally to be won, the federal role in both its
planning and its execution can only grow larger and more powerful in the years ahead.
Id.
71.
See, e.g., New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 619–21 (1973)
(equal protection challenge to limitation on welfare benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
260–61 (1970) (procedural due process challenge to termination of welfare benefits).
72.
See Denis Binder, The Spending Clause as a Positive Source of Environmental
Protection: A Primer, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 147, 147–148 (2001) (footnote omitted) (“The
underlying assumption [wa]s that the Commerce Clause grant[ed] virtually carte blanche
authority to Congress to legislate for environmental protection.”); Philip Soper, The
Constitutional Framework of Environmental Law, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 20, 24–
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Commerce Clause has been used as the source of authority for all manner of federal
regulatory programs,73 and the spending power has been used to authorize a wide
range of social welfare programs.74
Implicit in the dominant constitutional vision during the later years of the
New Deal and throughout the duration of the Great Society was the idea that the
primary constraints on federal power were political, rather than judicial.75 This was
made explicit in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority when the
Court declared that “[s]tate sovereign interests . . . are more properly protected by
procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by
judicially created limitations on federal power.”76 If federal authority were to be
limited, it would be the consequence of elections, combined with the continuation
of state representation in the Senate and the various “vetogates”77 and procedural
means to block legislative initiatives. Federalism was not really a matter for the
federal courts.
27 (Erica L. Dolgin & Thomas G. P. Guilbert eds., 1974) (observing that applying contemporary
Commerce Clause jurisprudence “to the environmental context results in a picture of
congressional power that appears practically unbounded at least as far as concerns control over
the typical areas of pollution”). But see id. at 21–22 (citing commentators who argued, in the
1960s, that some environmental concerns may lie beyond the scope of federal power). Insofar
as policy makers were concerned about constitutional constraints on the federal government’s
authority to enact environmental legislation, they tended to focus on the Fifth Amendment’s
Takings Clause. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., THE TAKING ISSUE 318–29 (1973)
(concluding an extensive analysis of recent Takings Clause jurisprudence and concluding that
“[t]he taking clause is a serious problem wherever there is substantial pressure for urban growth,
and particularly where the environment is sensitive”).
73.
This is the case with, for example, most federal environmental laws. See Steven
R. McAllister & Robert L. Glicksman, State Liability for Environmental Violations: The U.S.
Supreme Court’s New Federalism, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10665, 10666 (1999) (“[F]ederal
environmental laws generally are premised on Congress’ Article I power to regulate interstate
commerce . . . .”).
74.
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending
Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864 (2013) (“An enormous amount of the New
Deal/Great Society state is built on conditional spending statutes.”).
75.
See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the Federal Government, 54 COLUM. L.
REV. 543, 544 (1954) (“The actual extent of central intervention in the governance of our affairs
is determined far less by the formal power distribution than by the sheer existence of the states
and their political power to influence the action of the national authority.”); cf. Yoo, supra note
17, at 1334 (documenting the Court’s subsequent rejection of the “political safeguards”
approach to federalism).
76.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 552 (1985).
77.
See generally William S. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83
NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1441 (2008).
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III. THE VISION OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
Although widely accepted in the academy and the courts, the expansive
vision of federal power embodied in the Court’s New Deal jurisprudence and
subsequent Great Society programs was not uncontested.78 During the 1990s, the
Supreme Court reasserted the need for limits to federal power.79 In a series of
decisions, the Rehnquist Court forcefully reaffirmed the principle that the federal
government has only limited and enumerated powers.80 Repairing to “first
principles,”81 the Court invalidated a handful of federal statutes and pronounced
78.

See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting).

At one time in our history, the view that the structure of the Federal
Government sufficed to protect the States might have had a somewhat more practical,
although not a more logical, basis. . . . Not only is the premise of this view clearly at
odds with the proliferation of national legislation over the past 30 years, but “a variety
of structural and political changes occurring in this century have combined to make
Congress particularly insensitive to state and local values.”

Id. (quoting ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY
FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM 50 (1984)); see also Solum, supra note
9, at 4 (noting “the alternative understanding” that the New Deal only established “the
constitutionality of particular federal programs” and did not extinguish judicially enforceable
limits on federal power).
79.
It is remarkable now to note that the Supreme Court did not strike down a single
federal statute for exceeding the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers between 1936 and
1995. In 1976, the Court ruled 5–4 that Congress could not require state governments to pay
state employees the minimum wage in National League of Cities v. Usery. See 426 U.S. 833,
852 (1976). Within a few years, however, the Court began to whittle away at the National
League of Cities holding, ultimately overturning it in Garcia. See 469 U.S. 528, 555–57 (1985).
After that holding, the Court did not enforce limits on Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause again until it struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act (GFSZA). See United State
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
80.
The reemergence of judicially enforced limits on federal power was such a
turning point that many characterized it as a revolution. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1053–56 (2001)
(characterizing the cumulative effect of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions as a
“constitutional revolution”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV.
7, 7 (2001) (“[T]here has been a revolution with regard to the structure of the American
government because of the Supreme Court decisions in the last few years regarding
federalism.”). Writing in the New York Times, Linda Greenhouse proclaimed “it is only a slight
exaggeration to say that . . . the Court [is] a single vote shy of reinstalling the Articles of
Confederation.” Linda Greenhouse, Focus on Federal Power, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at
A1,
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/24/
us/focus-on-federal-power.html.
81.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first
principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”); see also
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the need for limits even as it upheld others.82 While these decisions did not threaten
the decisions of the New Deal Court, they refused to extend them into uncharted
waters. More broadly, they represented an alternative constitutional vision, one
that rejected the notion that courts should defer to assertions of federal authority
and proclaimed that federal power had reached its outer limits.83 They were, in a
sense, a pronouncement that federal power had reached its zenith, and could go no
further without a particularly compelling justification.
In United States v. Lopez, the Court held that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
(GFSZA), which prohibited the knowing possession of a gun within 1,000 feet of
a school, exceeded the scope of the commerce power.84 Stressing that “[t]he
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers,”85 the Court
rejected the argument that Congress could regulate intrastate activities with only a
tenuous connection to interstate commerce.86 Five years later, the Court reaffirmed
this holding in United States v. Morrison, striking down provisions of the Violence
Against Women Act (VAWA) that, like the GFSZA, were insufficiently connected
to interstate commerce.87
As the Court explained in Lopez and reiterated in Morrison, the commerce
power authorized Congress to regulate the use of the channels of interstate

Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003) (“[I]t is a hallmark—and perhaps the legacy—of the Rehnquist
Court to have brought back to the public-law table the notion that the Constitution is a charter
for a government of limited and enumerated powers . . . .”).
82.
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–02 (2000); Printz v.
United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997);
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
83.
See Solum, supra note 9, at 50 (noting that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism
decisions “reasoned from premises that were inconsistent with the then prevailing constitutional
gestalt”).
84.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551, 564, 567–68.
85.
Id. at 552.
86.
Id. at 564–68.
87.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602, 617–19. By some accounts, Morrison was the more
significant decision of the two in that it was written in more forceful terms, lacked a moderating
concurring opinion, and demonstrated the Court’s willingness to follow through on what was
suggested in Lopez. See Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse
Effects?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1325, 1327 (2001) (“[T]he warning shot across Congress’ bow in
Lopez has been followed by the full-out broadside of United States v. Morrison.”); see also
Jonathan H. Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 751, 759 (2005) (“While most associate the reinvigoration of Commerce Clause
scrutiny with Lopez, Morrison was the real breakthrough for enumerated powers
jurisprudence.”).
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commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and persons or things in
interstate commerce.88 Thus, for example, Congress may regulate or prohibit the
sale of driver’s license information and other personal data collected by public and
private entities because such information is bought and sold in interstate
commerce.89
More broadly, the Court noted that the commerce power had also been
interpreted to authorize regulation of those activities that “substantially affect”
interstate commerce.90 This authority could be inconceivably broad, as just about
everything has some effect on interstate commerce, particularly if individual
instances are aggregated together.91 Yet the Court was also concerned with limits.
As described and applied in Lopez and Morrison, the substantial effects test meant
that Congress could reach not only those activities that are themselves related to
“‘commerce’ or any sort of economic enterprise,” but also instances of
noneconomic intrastate activity in which the regulation is “an essential part of a
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.”92 Conversely, the Court
reasoned, the fact that a given noneconomic activity might have a substantial
economic impact when aggregated with all other instances of like conduct was
insufficient to bring that noneconomic activity within Congress’s regulatory
jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause.93 Thus, Congress could regulate
intrastate activities that were themselves “economic in nature,”94 such as industrial

88.
89.

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607–09; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552–55.
See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 148 (2000) (upholding the Driver’s Privacy
Protection Act as a proper exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power).
90.
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558–59 (“Within this final category, admittedly, our case
law has not been clear whether an activity must ‘affect’ or ‘substantially affect’ interstate
commerce in order to be within Congress’ power to regulate it under the Commerce Clause.”).
91.
See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 839 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc) (illustrating the extent to which aggregation would permit Congress to regulate
noneconomic activities under the guise of the Commerce Clause by citing estimates that
insomnia has an estimated $92.5 to $107.5 billion annual impact on the U.S. economy), aff’d
sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
92.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
93.
In Morrison the Court explicitly rejected “the argument that Congress may
regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect
on interstate commerce.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617.
94.
See id. at 613.
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mining95 or loan-sharking,96 but not gender-motivated violence97 or gun possession
near a school.98
While the Rehnquist Court enforced limits on the exercise of the commerce
power and also acted to protect state sovereign immunity and safeguard state
autonomy against commandeering,99 it was more circumspect about the power to
spend. In 1987, in South Dakota v. Dole, the Court identified a series of restraints
on Congress’s authority to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds
designed to ensure that federal pressure would not turn into compulsion, but
nonetheless upheld an expansive use of such conditions.100 And although the Court
would reiterate that there were constitutional limits on the amount of pressure the
federal government could impose on states when seeking their cooperation, it
routinely upheld conditional funding provisions.101 Indeed, until NFIB the Court
had never struck down conditional spending on such grounds.102
In Dole, the Court identified several constraints on congressional use of
conditional federal spending to induce state cooperation. First, the appropriation
of funds must be for the general welfare103 and not transgress any other
95.
See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 268
(1981).
96.
See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156–57 (1971).
97.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601–02.
98.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). It is worth noting that Alfonso
Lopez was engaged in economic activity, as he had brought the gun to school as part of a gun
sale. See United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993). The GFSZA was
nonetheless unconstitutional, as the activity subject to regulation—possession of a gun near a
school—was not economic. A similarly formalistic analysis would inform the Chief Justice’s
analysis of the individual mandate. See Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Minimalism, the Mandate,
and Mr. Roberts, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS 171, 177 (Nathaniel Persily, et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter THE HEALTH CARE
CASE].
99.
See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 174–75 (1992).
100.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
101.
See, e.g., Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 608 (2004); New York, 505 U.S.
at 173.
102.
See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2630 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
(“The Chief Justice therefore—for the first time ever—finds an exercise of Congress’ spending
power unconstitutionally coercive.”); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Crafting a Narrative
for the Red State Option, 102 KY. L. J. 381, 384 (2014) (“The NFIB Medicaid decision was
unprecedented as a matter of federalism jurisprudence.”).
103.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937)).
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constitutional limit on government power that acts as an “independent bar.”104 The
Court further explained that any conditions imposed upon the receipt of federal
funds must be clear and unambiguous so that recipient states have clear notice of
any obligations imposed.105 There must also be a sufficient nexus between the
substance of the conditions imposed and the purpose of the federal spending.106
Finally, the Dole Court suggested that conditional spending could be
unconstitutional if “the financial inducement offered by Congress” was “so
coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’”107 While
not explaining what degree of financial inducement would be necessary to cross
this line, the Court stressed that the relatively small amount of money at stake
provided “relatively mild encouragement to the States” and was not coercive.108
Left unsaid was whether placing conditions on a much larger amount of money
would be coercive in itself or whether this would merely influence the degree of
scrutiny with which the other prongs of the Dole test would be applied.
A recurring theme throughout the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions is
the need to maintain judicially enforceable limits on federal power.109 These limits,
even if rather modest, are necessary to maintain the underlying constitutional
structure of limited, separated, and enumerated powers. Thus, in Lopez, the Court
stressed that the federal government failed to offer any limit on the asserted scope
of Congress’s commerce power.110 Although the Rehnquist Court was willing to
uphold an expansive conception of federal authority, there needed to be a limit.
While the Rehnquist Court’s rhetoric stressed the need for limits, the Court’s
104.
Id. at 208 (citing Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256,
269–70 (1985)).
105.
Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)).
106.
Id. at 207–08; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (“Such conditions must . . .
bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending; otherwise, of course, the spending
power could render academic the Constitution’s other grants and limits of federal authority.”
(citations omitted)).
107.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
108.
Id.
109.
See Bagenstos, supra note 74, at 899 (“Since the beginnings of the ‘Federalist
Revival’ in the Rehnquist Court, the notion that there must be some judicially enforceable
federalism-based limits to Congress’s authority has been a driving force of the Court’s
jurisprudence.”).
110.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (“[I]f we were to accept the
Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that
Congress is without power to regulate.”).
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seeming reluctance to enforce these limits with much rigor left some doubt as to
whether the rhetoric was believable. After all, even during the New Deal, the Court
often reiterated the need to keep congressional authority within constitutional
bounds, even as it approved one expansive exercise of federal authority after
another.111 By the time of the Great Society, the Court had little difficulty
approving expansive assertions of federal power.112 Against this backdrop, it was
easy to read Lopez and the Rehnquist Court’s other federalism decisions as minor
exceptions to a general rule permitting Congress to exercise expansive federal
power.113 Lower courts, already reluctant to invalidate federal statutes for
exceeding the scope of Congress’s enumerated powers, certainly took this view.
Other than the Fourth Circuit,114 no appellate court struck down a federal statute
on Commerce Clause grounds between 1995 and 2000,115 and Morrison did little
to change this pattern.116

111.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (“The
authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an extreme as to destroy the
distinction, which the commerce clause itself establishes, between commerce ‘among the
several States’ and the internal concerns of a State.”).
112.
See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 156–57 (1971) (upholding
Congress’s authority to regulate intrastate loan-sharking under the Consumer Credit Protection
Act as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause).
113.
See, e.g., Garnett, supra note 81, at 5 (“Lopez and other New Federalism salvos
notwithstanding, it remains settled law that Congress may spend money on projects and in
pursuit of ends that are not authorized explicitly in Article I, and also may enthusiastically
promote policy goals that might lie beyond the reach of its enumerated powers merely by
attaching conditions to the money it spends.”).
114.
See Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst., 169 F.3d 820, 839 (4th Cir. 1999) (en
banc), aff’d sub nom. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that “Lopez
clearly forecloses . . . congressional regulation of noneconomic activities such as the conduct
reached by section 13981” under the guise of an exercise of Commerce Clause powers).
115.
See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez,
or What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS.
L. REV. 369, 385 n.85 (2000).
116.
After Morrison there were a handful of cases in which federal courts upheld asapplied Commerce Clause challenges to federal statutes. See, e.g., Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d
1222, 1234 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding an as-applied Commerce Clause challenge to the
application of the federal Controlled Substances Act to medical marijuana), vacated, Gonzales
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Stewart v. United States, 348 F.3d 1132, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2003)
(upholding a Commerce Clause challenge to a federal prohibition of the possession of fully
automatic weapons as applied to a homemade firearm), vacated, United States v. Steward, 545
U.S. 1112 (2005); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1129–30 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding
a Commerce Clause challenge to a federal prohibition on the possession of child pornography
as applied to a family photo), overruled by United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750 (9th Cir.
2008).
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This interpretation of the Court’s jurisprudence was reinforced by the
Court’s decision upholding the application of the Controlled Substances Act to the
noncommercial, intrastate possession of marijuana for medical purposes in
Gonzales v. Raich.117 The expansive formulations in Justice John Paul Stevens’s
majority and Justice Antonin Scalia’s concurrence seemed to back away from the
Court’s insistence that the power to regulate commerce was limited.118 This served
to create some doubt as to whether the Rehnquist Court’s limitations on federal
power were real. Indeed, after Raich, there would not be another federal statute
invalidated by a federal appellate court for exceeding the scope of the federal
government’s enumerated powers until the ACA was struck down by the Eleventh
Circuit.119
IV. THE COMPETING VISIONS OF OBAMACARE
NFIB set up a contest of constitutional visions because it presented the Court
with novel assertions of federal power that forced the Court to consider anew the
extent to which courts should enforce constitutional limits on enumerated powers.
The debate over the constitutionality of the individual mandate, and to a lesser
degree the Medicaid expansion, became a debate over competing constitutional
visions.120 Partisans in the debate over the mandate did not disagree on the
application of clearly settled precedents so much as they disagreed over the
meaning of those precedents and the underlying nature of federal power.
Those who supported the mandate’s constitutionality viewed it as nothing
more than the federal government’s latest effort to regulate an important sector of
the economy for the purpose of expanding the social safety net.121 The purchase of

117.
118.

See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005).
See Douglas W. Kmiec, Gonzales v. Raich: Wickard v. Filburn Displaced,
2004–2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71, 92 (“For the majority and Scalia, federal power over
interstate commerce marijuana is without limit, even if the state has identified a discrete subpart
(noncommercial, medicinal uses) over which federal power is not appropriate.”); see also Adler,
supra note 87, at 762–63 (2005) (“Both the majority and concurring opinions hollowed out
Morrison's core—leaving it without any substance, if any life at all.”).
119.
See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328
(11th Cir. 2011).
120.
The debate over the Medicaid expansion presented the conflict of visions less
starkly because there was much less debate over these provisions. Most discussion over the
constitutionality of the ACA focused on the individual mandate, not the Medicaid provisions.
See generally CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 179–220. Moreover, whereas some lower courts
had invalidated the minimum coverage requirement, no lower court had invalidated the
Medicaid expansion for exceeding the scope of federal power.
121.
See Orin S. Kerr, Some Tentative Thoughts on the Constitutionality of the
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healthcare and the provision of health insurance were indisputably economic
activities subject to regulation, so a requirement that individuals purchase health
insurance was also a form of economic regulation.122 Moreover, the purpose and
effect of the requirement were both clearly economic, insofar as they were
designed to ensure that more younger and healthier individuals participated in the
individual market for health insurance so as to help offset the consequences of
requiring insurance companies to issue policies and disregard preexisting
conditions.123 Finally, it seemed rather clear that the requirement to purchase
insurance was an integral part of a broader regulatory scheme—it was not adopted
for its own sake so much as it was adopted to ensure the smooth operation of the
other reforms Congress enacted.124 It was a necessary and proper means of
ensuring that insurance markets did not collapse in response to the imposition of
new, and clearly constitutional, regulatory measures.
If one started from the premise that Congress has plenary authority to
regulate economic activity so long as it does not transgress any of the limitations
on government power provided by the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bill of
Rights, the case for the constitutionality of the mandate was open and shut.
Whatever doubt there may have been about the constitutionality of such a
provision after Lopez and Morrison, the Court’s embrace of expansive federal
regulation and insistence that courts not excise individual provisions from broader
economic regulatory schemes in Raich seemed to make the case for the mandate
easily settled.125
From another vantage point, however, the ACA represented an
Individual Mandate Under Current Supreme Court Doctrine, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at
46, 47 (“As I understand it, the basic idea was to stop people from burdening the health care
system with the costs of emergency care that resulted when people opted out of health insurance.
Whether that was wise or not, it’s a genuine effort to regulate interstate commerce.”).
122.
See
Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health
Insurance, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 40, 42 (2009) (“It is manifest that health insurance deals with
economic transactions and substantially affects interstate commerce.”).
123.
See
BLACKMAN, supra note 1, at 4 (“The individual mandate is primarily aimed
at the young and healthy, a group that poses a very low risk of incurring health care costs and
would be cheap to insure.”).
124.
See
David B. Kopel, Destroying the Constitution’s Structure is Not
Constitutional, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 34, 37 (“[T]he main provision of Obamacare—
turning private insurance companies into ultraregulated public utilities—makes no sense
without the individual mandate.”).
125.
See
Hall, supra note 122, at 41–42 (arguing that “absent any special states' rights
concerns under the 10th Amendment,” it was already “clear and well settled that Congress has
the power to mandate the purchase of health insurance”); see also Mark A. Hall, Commerce
Clause Challenges To Health Care Reform, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1825, 1825–27 (2011).
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unprecedented expansion of federal power, a novel exercise of regulatory
authority, a naked mandate imposed on all those within the nation, and an effort to
create commerce that could then be regulated. If nothing else, such an
unprecedented assertion of federal power increased the burden on the government
to establish its fidelity to the principles of enumerated powers.126
For the first time, Congress sought to require individuals to purchase a good
or service from a private company. 127 Indeed, mandating individuals to engage in
economic activity of any sort had never been done before. Through the minimum
coverage provision, Congress sought to impose an affirmative legal obligation on
all those in the country, without regard for whether they had elected to engage in
economic activity. As in Wickard v. Filburn and Raich, the mandate was part of a
broader regulatory scheme, but in both of those cases, an individual only became
subject to federal regulation by choosing to engage in activity able to be
regulated—growing wheat or possessing marijuana, respectively.128 Had Roscoe
Filburn or Angel Raich not taken such steps, federal regulation would have been
avoided.129
Though the arguments in favor of the mandate’s constitutionality seemed
straightforward, particularly in light of Raich, those of us who came to doubt the
mandate’s constitutionality worried the arguments offered on behalf of the ACA
lacked inherent limits. The federal government’s strongest argument is that the
individual mandate is necessary to facilitate other aspects of healthcare reform, and
thus, must be valid as “necessary and proper” to the regulation of health insurance
markets.130 But this argument proves to be too much. The individual mandate does
not, as written, truly solve the adverse selection problem created by other aspects

126.
See Bernstein, supra note 4, at 212 (“Democrats in Congress essentially ignored
plausible constitutional objections to the ACA’s individual mandate, and therefore have only
themselves to blame if the law is declared unconstitutional.”).
127.
See Kopel, supra note 124, at 36 (“No prior case stands for the proposition that
Congress may use the interstate commerce power to order persons to buy a particular product,
or may use the tax power to punish people for choosing not to purchase a particular product.”).
128.
See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S.
111, 113 (1937).
129.
See Commonwealth ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780
(E.D. Va. 2010) (“In both cases, the activity under review was the product of a self-directed
affirmative move to cultivate and consume wheat or marijuana. This self-initialed change of
position voluntarily placed the subject within the stream of commerce. Absent that step,
governmental regulation could have been avoided.”).
130.
See Ilya Somin, Necessary and Proper Clause Doctrine and the Individual
Mandate, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 48.
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of healthcare reform.131 It only helps on the margin. That is, it modestly ameliorates
the adverse selection problem created by the elimination of medical
underwriting.132 If this is enough to satisfy the Necessary and Proper Clause, then
Congress could mandate that all individuals engage in any behavior that helps keep
health insurance costs down by increasing the participation of healthy people in
insurance pools or improving the health of those already in the pool.133 So, for
instance, Congress could mandate all Americans join health clubs or even purchase
fruits and vegetables, for these too would help lower healthcare costs on the
margin—albeit to a much smaller degree—and facilitate achievement of
healthcare reform’s goals.134
Some argued Congress may have the power to mandate health club
memberships or some related thing but that it would never do so because such an
extreme step would be so politically unpopular (presumably more unpopular than
the mandate at the time of its adoption).135 Thus, courts need not worry about such
extreme, and extremely unlikely, scenarios. This is a coherent argument, but it is
one that implicitly assumes the unconstrained vision of federal power is correct. It
is the argument Justice Harry Blackmun made for the Court in Garcia,136 embraced

131.
See Balkin, supra note 12, at 46 (noting that the ACA’s promise of guaranteed
coverage for all who apply for health insurance created “a problem of adverse selection”
because “many people will wait until they become ill to purchase health insurance, knowing
that they cannot be turned down”).
132.
See Andrew Koppelman, “Necessary,” “Proper,” and Health Care Reform, in
THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 98, at 105, 106–07 (“The ACA’s mandate was just another
technique for financing broad coverage, adopted, despite its unpopularity, because all the other
options had proven politically impossible or practically inadequate.”).
133.
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Individual Mandate Necessary?, VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY,
(Oct.
14,
2010),
http://www.volokh.com/2010/10/14/is-the-indivi
dual-mandate-necessary/.
134.
See Ilya Somin, Broccoli, Slippery Slopes, and the Individual Mandate, in
CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 91, 92 (“Forcing people to purchase broccoli or other food could
be defended as a public health measure. . . . The logic of the pro-health care mandate argument
can justify virtually any mandate to purchase or do anything.”).
135.
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Health Care Reform: The Broccoli Objection,
BALKINIZATION, (Jan. 19, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/01/health-care-reformbroccoli-objection.html (attacking the “Broccoli Objection” to the individual mandate because
“Congress is never going to force you to eat your broccoli”).
136.
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985).
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by the dissenters in Lopez137 and Morrison,138 as well as in other federalism
cases.139
Yet if one sees Lopez and Morrison as repudiating this vision and endorsing
the need for judicially enforceable limits, it makes no difference whether Congress
would mandate the purchase of GM cars, health-club memberships, or even
broccoli. For those who maintain a constrained vision of federal power, political
safeguards are not enough. What matters is whether there is a judicially
administrable limit on federal power consistent with the Court’s precedents.140
Similarly, the argument that healthcare is “different,” however persuasive as a
matter of policy, does not satisfy the call for more formal limits on the scope of
federal power as suggested by at least one reading of the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism opinions.141
In many respects, NFIB presented the judiciary with a replay of Lopez.142
The Court’s expansive precedents had been given even more expansive
interpretations by the majority of academic commentators who defended the
ACA’s individual mandate, but the Court consistently maintained that federal
regulatory authority has judicially enforceable limits and that upholding the
individual mandate—much like upholding the GFSZA—would make any of these
limits difficult, if not impossible, to discern.143 What Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
137.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that judicial review under the Commerce Clause must defer to Congress’s
“rationally based legislative judgments” and that the check on the exercise of Congress’s power
comes from its “political accountability”).
138.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528, 649 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“As
with ‘conflicts of economic interest,’ so with supposed conflicts of sovereign political interests
implicated by the Commerce Clause: the Constitution remits them to politics.”).
139.
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 33 (2005) (upholding Congress’s power
to enforce the CSA, but implying that opposition to the CSA should turn to “the democratic
process, in which the voices of voters allied with these respondents may one day be heard in the
halls of Congress”).
140.
See Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 606–07 (2010)
(“Accepting this theory would open the door for an infinite variety of mandates in the future.”).
141.
Cf. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (acknowledging that “no civilized system of
justice could fail to provide [Brzonkala] a remedy” but stating that “under our federal system
that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the United States”).
142.
See Jonathan H. Adler, The Individual Mandate as a Replay of United States v.
Lopez, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.volokh.com/2010/10/
15/the-individual-mandate-debate-as-a-replay-of-united-states-v-lopez/.
143.
See Jonathan H. Adler, Guns, Broccoli, and the Individual Mandate: Thoughts
on the Eve of Argument, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 176, 176 (comparing Lopez to the
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in Lopez was arguably true in NFIB as well: “if we were to accept the
Government’s arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual
that Congress is without power to regulate.”144
While academics were generally—though not universally—disdainful of the
need for limits, those defending the ACA in federal court saw a need to identify
judicially enforceable limits on federal power.145 Unlike the solicitors general who
had tried to defend the GFSZA and VAWA, those defending the ACA recognized
the need to explain why allowing the mandate would not open the door to nearly
unlimited federal power.146 Mandate opponents identified potential limits, such as
the distinction between activity and inactivity or that between regulating
preexisting conduct and mandating that given conduct occur in the first place.147
Based on these distinctions, a Court could conclude that the individual mandate
exceeded the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause—as
supplemented by the Necessary and Proper Clause—without undermining any
other portions of the U.S. Code.148 Whether it is necessary to identify such a limit
on federal power, however, depends on which vision of the Constitution prevails.
Some academics recognized that a majority of the Court was likely to insist
on identifying a meaningful limit on federal power that would remain if a mandate
to purchase health insurance were upheld. The Rehnquist Court’s opinions seemed
to require as much,149 but it remained difficult to identify a line without upending
settled precedent. Professors Neil Siegel and Robert Cooter, for example,
then-ongoing NFIB case and observing that “then, as now, defenders of the federal law have a
difficult time reconciling their arguments with meaningful limits on federal power”).
144.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
145.
See David E. Bernstein, Has the Pro-ACA Side Come Up with a “Limiting
Principle”?, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 182, 183 (“So far, we seem to be left with the
‘health care is special’ argument, which is not a limiting principle but could persuade a
conservative justice or two to join a limited holding. Yet Justice Kennedy suggested today that
if the ACA is upheld, the government will soon be back arguing that some other sector of the
economy is ‘special.’”).
146.
See BLACKMAN, supra note 1, at 134–39. As Blackman notes, the Office of the
Solicitor General eventually abandoned the search for a limit on the federal commerce power,
under the assumption that it could not identify a limit that was likely to satisfy those Justices
who believed it was necessary to identify such a limit. Instead, the office sought to cultivate
support for upholding the mandate as an exercise of the taxing power. Id. at 159–66.
147.
See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Baffled that Anyone is Baffled by the ActivityInactivity Distinction, in CONSPIRACY, supra note 4, at 104, 104–06 (“One way to think about
the activity-inactivity distinction is to recognize the difference between prohibiting conduct or
imposing conditions on conduct, on the one hand, and mandating conduct on the other.”).
148.
See Neil S. Siegel, None of the Laws but One, 62 DRAKE L. REV. ___ (2014).
149.
See supra Part III.
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articulated a theory of “collective action federalism” that could justify the mandate
without freeing federal power from constitutional constraint.150 Under this theory,
the federal government is empowered to act when collective action problems
prevent individual states from acting on their own.151 Thus, if states are wary of
enacting certain types of health insurance reforms on their own for fear that they
would be forced to shoulder disproportionate costs if their neighbors do not follow
suit, federal intervention would be justified.152
The Siegel–Cooter theory outlines an elegant and internally coherent
constitutional architecture that observes the need to keep federal power within
articulable limits. At first glance, it seems to offer a plausible account of the
Court’s Commerce Clause decisions.153 Neither the GFSZA nor VAWA addressed
a collective action problem,154 whereas the Agricultural Adjustment Act and
Controlled Substances Act dealt with national markets in commodities that states
could not effectively regulate on their own—or so our federal representatives could
have rationally concluded.155 Yet it does not fully answer the constrained vision’s
call for limits because it cannot provide a plausible account of the Court’s current
federalism jurisprudence beyond these cases. Were the Supreme Court to have
upheld the individual mandate on the grounds Siegel and Cooter suggested, it
would necessarily repudiate the rationales underlying some of the Court’s other
federalism decisions.156
150.
See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General
Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 164–65 (2010) (arguing that “the phrase
‘among the several States’ references a problem of collective action involving at least two
states” and that the Commerce Clause should be construed accordingly “to give Congress the
authority to solve collective action problems”).
151.
See id. at 159–66 (framing the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence in terms
of “a more functional logic” that “may in fact have animated the Court” to reach seemingly
inconsistent results “in Lopez, Morrison, and Raich”).
152.
See id. at 159 (arguing that “Congress should exercise its constitutional power”
when “the need for cooperation involves numerous states, or when states face historical or
political obstacles to cooperation”).
153.
See id. at 159–66.
154.
See id. at 163 (highlighting the fact that Lopez did not involve an attempt to solve
a collective action problem—“the absence of regulation of guns near schools in one state would
not undercut the effectiveness of regulations prohibiting them in other states”).
155.
See id. at 160 (framing Wickard in collective action terms as a case in which
“Congress perceived a national problem of overproduction of wheat,” but determined that only
“national regulation could effectively reduce production”); id. at 164 (noting that Raich
presented “a potential spillover problem” because “the market for marijuana disrespects state
borders”).
156.
Of note, some of these cases, such as New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), are not cited at all in the Siegel and
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First, the Court’s anticommandeering decisions—New York v. United States
and Printz v. United States—suggest that a collective action problem may be
necessary, but still not sufficient, to render an exercise of the commerce power to
be necessary and proper.157 Both cases involved clear collective action problems
related to economic activities, and in both cases, the laws were struck down on
federalism grounds. The law at issue in New York was an effort to induce states to
provide for the disposal of low-level radioactive waste, which no state wanted to
do on its own.158 It was based on an agreement among several states expressly
predicated on the idea that collective action was necessary to solve the problem.159
But it was still unconstitutional because it sought to commandeer the states.160 The
law in Printz could likewise be seen as an effort to solve a collective action
problem, as no state would be able to prevent the purchase of guns without a
background check if individuals could easily cross state lines to purchase a gun in
a state without a background check requirement.161
In neither case was the existence of a collective action problem enough to
save the law. In each case the Court concluded that the federal law at issue, no
matter how necessary, was not proper for carrying into execution an exercise of
the federal government’s power to regulate commerce among the states, despite
the existence of a collective action problem.162 So while the collective action theory
would be enough to justify much federal regulation of health insurance, it would
not necessarily be enough to justify the individual mandate, particularly if one were
concerned with the propriety of mandating activity for the purpose of regulation or
otherwise saw the mandate as an effort to commandeer the people.163
The Siegel–Cooter collective action theory also has problems explaining the
outcomes of recent decisions in which the Court construed the scope of federal
Cooter article. See generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 150, at 159–66.
157.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24; New York, 505 U.S. at 166.
158.
See New York, 505 U.S. at 174–76.
159.
See id. at 196–99 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (detailing
the history of the provision in question and concluding that “these statutes are best understood
as the products of collective state action”).
160.
See id. at 176–77.
161.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
162.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 931–33 (“It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty
that such a law offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can overcome
that fundamental defect.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 177–80 (holding that independent limits on
the exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers still apply “whether or not a particularly strong
federal interest enables Congress to bring state governments within the orbit of generally
applicable federal regulation”).
163.
See generally, Barnett, supra note 140, at 629.
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statutes narrowly so as to avoid potential constitutional problems. In Solid Waste
Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Rapanos
v. United States, a majority of the Court adopted a narrowing interpretation of the
scope of regulatory jurisdiction over “waters of the United States” under the Clean
Water Act to avoid an interpretation of the Act that could exceed the scope of the
federal government’s Commerce Clause power.164 The theory of federal power
necessary to uphold such a broad assertion of regulatory authority could likewise
justify federal regulation of local land use.165 Yet under the collective action theory
of federalism, federal legislators would have been justified in authorizing federallevel action if they could reasonably believe that states would not adopt sufficiently
stringent regulations governing water pollution, wetlands development, or even
land use generally, due to fears of interstate competition.166 Again, the collective
action theory of federalism would readily embrace assertions of federal power the
Supreme Court has recently rejected. So, while upholding the mandate on a
collective action theory of Congress’s powers would have respected the need for
limits, it would have resulted in limits on federal power quite different from those
identified by the Court in the federalism decisions of the past 20 years. Thus, if a
majority of the Court wanted to find a limiting principle for the scope of federal
power that would both uphold the individual mandate as an exercise of the
commerce power and be consistent with existing precedent, it would have to look
elsewhere.
In the case of the spending power, the conflict of visions was less acute, but
only because there was less need to reconcile potentially competing lines of cases.
Since the New Deal, the Court had reiterated the need to constrain the federal
government’s ability to induce states to engage in conduct that Congress could not
compel, but it had not enforced these limits. Conditioning the receipt of federal
164.
Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738–39 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook Cnty., 531 U.S. 159, 173–74 (2001).
165.
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 755–56.
166.
Collective action federalism theory suggests that Congress would be permitted
to “regulate noncommercial harms that spill over state boundaries, such as certain
environmental problems.” Cooter & Siegel, supra note 150, at 120, 176–78 (emphasis
removed). The potential existence of collective action problems is a commonly offered rationale
for the adoption of federal environmental regulations. See, e.g., Peter P. Swire, The Race to
Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions
in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67, 99–100 (1996). But see Richard Revesz, The
Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L.
REV. 535, 540–42 (1997). There are also reasons to question whether federal intervention solves
such collective action problems. See Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of
Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 94–106
(2007).
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money on state cooperation was not new—not even for the Medicaid program.167
In the ACA, Congress went further than it had before, at least as measured by the
amount of money at stake.168 Moreover, with the Medicaid expansion, Congress
sought to leverage state reliance on the prior receipt of funds to ensure
cooperation.169 This combination, much like a mandate to purchase a good or
service, was unprecedented. On this basis, some two dozen states argued that here,
too, Congress had asserted an unconstrained power to leverage public funds to
achieve political ends.170 Pushing in the other direction, however, was the fact that
the Court had never held that the imposition of conditions on a state’s receipt of
federal funds was unconstitutionally coercive.171 After all, even if Congress
presented states with an unpleasant choice, they still had a choice.
V. THE VISION OF NFIB
For those who opposed the individual mandate and believed it to be an
unconstitutional assertion of federal power, the Court’s decision in NFIB was a
disappointment. Yet for those who hoped the Court would reaffirm that the
Constitution creates a federal government of limited and enumerated powers and
that it is the responsibility of the Court to enforce such limits, there was much to
like in the decision. While the Court upheld the mandate—or, more properly,
upheld the financial assessment for failing to purchase health insurance as an
exercise of the taxing power—it reaffirmed the principle that federal power is
subject to judicially enforceable limits and that the federalism decisions of the
Rehnquist Court were not aberrations. In this respect, the NFIB decision embraced
the constrained vision, even as it upheld nearly all of the ACA against
167.
See Leonard, supra note 102, at 391 (“Unlike prior federal conditional spending
programs, which operated as limited grants-in-aid to states, Medicaid was created and continues
to offer open-ended federal funding to the states so long as they comply with broad federal
requirements under the Medicaid Act.”).
168.
See Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging
into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 25 (2013) (noting that the ACA “effectively rais[ed]
the income threshold” for Medicaid eligibility “to 138% [of the federal poverty level],”
representing a dramatic expansion in the amount of people covered—and the amount of federal
funds involved).
169.
See BLACKMAN, supra note 1, at 133 (“The only problem with declining the new
funding, the challengers argued, was that failure to accept this new Medicaid program would
also eliminate all of the previous funding they had grown accustomed to receiving.”).
170.
See Jost, State Lawsuits, supra note 6, at 1227 (“[A]ttorneys general in twentyone states have asked the courts to declare the act unconstitutional, in a suit initially filed by
Florida and twelve other states.”).
171.
See BLACKMAN, supra note 1, at 134.
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constitutional challenge.172
The opening of Chief Justice John Roberts’s opinion for the Court is a clear
and forceful restatement of the principle of limited and enumerated powers.173
“The enumeration of powers is also a limitation of powers,” he wrote,174 echoing
Chief Justice Marshall.175 He noted that the Bill of Rights, however important, is
not the only limitation on federal power. “If no enumerated power authorizes
Congress to pass a certain law, that law may not be enacted, even if it would not
violate” individual rights protected under the Constitution or the Court’s
precedents.176 This inherent limitation on federal power, the Chief Justice
continued, is essential for the preservation of state sovereignty, which, in turn, “is
not just an end in itself” but rather the means to “secure[] to citizens the liberties
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”177 And while the judiciary is to
play a “limited role in policing” the boundaries of federal power, the Chief Justice
stressed that the Court’s “respect for Congress’s policy judgments” only goes so
far, as “it is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the limits on federal power
by striking down acts of Congress that transgress those limits.”178 In opening his
opinion for the Court in this way, the Chief Justice effectively finalized the Court’s
repudiation of the political safeguards theory of federalism briefly embraced in
Garcia.179
The mandate, as seen by the Chief Justice and the joint dissenters, “does not
172.
See generally, Randy E. Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Health Care Case
(and Why Did so Many Law Professors Miss the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331, 1340–43 (2013)
(commenting that although “Chief Justice Roberts's decision made bad law” in some respects,
it affirmed the all-important proposition “that the powers of Congress were limited by Article I
of the Constitution”).
173.
Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) (“In our
federal system, the National Government possess only limited powers; the States and the people
retain the remainder.”).
174.
Id.
175.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824) (“The enumeration
presupposes something not enumerated . . . .”).
176.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2577.
177.
Id. at 2578 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992)).
178.
Id. at 2577, 2579–80 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175–
76 (1803)).
179.
Not only did the Chief Justice and joint dissenters reject the premise of Garcia,
but Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent did not expressly endorse Garcia either. See id. at
2609–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part); see also Metzger, supra note 10, at 98 (“Garcia did not even surface in Justice Ginsburg’s
opinion, demonstrating how far the Court has moved over the last twenty-five years toward
judicial enforcement of constitutional federalism.”).
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regulate existing commercial activity.”180 Instead, it compels individuals to engage
in commerce, “on the ground that their failure to do so affects interstate
commerce.”181 Such a conception of the commerce power could not be squared
with the text or the doctrine of limited and enumerated powers. “The power to
regulate commerce presupposes the existence of commercial activity to be
regulated,” the Chief Justice stated.182 However expansive the Court’s conception
of the commerce power in Wickard, Roscoe Filburn “was at least actively engaged
in the production of wheat”183—and for commercial purposes, no less.184 Further,
“[i]f the power to ‘regulate’ something included the power to create it, many of the
provisions in the Constitution would be superfluous,” such as the power to “coin
Money” and “regulate the Value thereof.”185 If, as Chief Justice Roberts suggested,
an analysis of the government’s power had to begin with the relevant text and the
fact of enumeration, this was a problem.
Upholding the government’s arguments in support of the mandate would,
according to the Chief Justice, give Congress a vast, new power.186 After all, each
day, “individuals do not do an infinite number of things.”187 They do not purchase
a nearly infinite number of goods or engage in myriad economic transactions in
which they could have engaged, and these economic actions-that-never-were,
taken together, surely have as much of an effect on commerce as the failure to
purchase federally approved health insurance. Such a doctrine would give
Congress authority over “countless decisions” individuals make each day and
“empower Congress to make those decisions” for them.188 Whether justified under
the Commerce Clause standing alone, or in combination with the Necessary and
Proper Clause, such an expansive power would make a mockery of the notion of
limited enumerated powers and “fundamentally chang[e] the relation between the
citizen and the Federal Government.”189 The result, according to Chief Justice
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2587.
Id.
Id. at 2586.
Id. at 2588.
See Jim Chen, The Story of Wickard v. Filburn: Agriculture, Aggregation, and
Congressional Power over Commerce, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 69, 83–86 (Michael
C. Dorf ed. 2009).
185.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2586 (internal quotation marks omitted).
186.
Id. at 2587 (“Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate
individuals precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast
domain to congressional authority.”).
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
189.
Id. at 2589.
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Roberts, would “not [be] the country the Framers of our Constitution
envisioned.”190
Chief Justice Roberts nonetheless voted to uphold the penalty for failing to
purchase health insurance as a constitutional exercise of the taxing power.191 While
disappointing to those who argued that the mandate should be struck down, this
holding does little, if anything, to expand the scope of federal power and has the
effect of eliminating the “mandate” as a mandate.192 Congress regularly enacts
laws under which an individual’s tax burden is higher or lower based upon whether
the individual engages in activities of which the federal government approves.
Viewed in economic terms, the consequence of the tax for failing to purchase
qualifying health insurance is that an individual who purchases such insurance has
a lower tax burden than a person who does not. The same advantage is gained by
an individual who installs solar panels of energy-efficient appliances in their
home,193 purchases an alternative fuel vehicle,194 or gives to charity.195
The question in NFIB was not whether Congress can impose differential tax
burdens based upon whether individuals comply with the government’s dictates
but whether, in this case, Congress actually used the tax power to accomplish this
goal. The joint dissenters rejected the Chief Justice’s argument because those who
supported the ACA routinely disclaimed any reliance on the taxing power and
because of questions as to whether the penalty actually complied with other
constitutional requirements for taxes.196 Whether or not these criticisms of the
Court’s majority on this issue are persuasive, the point here is merely that the

190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id. at 2593–600.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1338 (“To ‘save’ the rest of the ACA, the Chief
Justice essentially deleted the ‘requirement’ part. So the mandate qua mandate is gone. What is
left is a tax.”).
193.
See
26 U.S.C. § 25D(a)(1) (2012) (“In the case of an individual, there shall be
allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year an amount equal
to the sum of 30 percent of the qualified solar electric property expenditures made by the
taxpayer during such year . . . .”).
See
26 U.S.C. § 30B(e) (2012) (“[T]he new qualified alternative fuel motor
194.
vehicle credit determined under this subsection is an amount equal to the applicable percentage
of the incremental cost of any new qualified alternative fuel motor vehicle placed in service by
the taxpayer during the taxable year.”).
195.
See
26 U.S.C. § 170(a)(1) (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction any
charitable contribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable year. A charitable
contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations prescribed by
the Secretary.”).
196.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2598 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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Court’s willingness to uphold the penalty as a tax does not in any way indicate a
rejection of the constrained vision of federal power. Further, in treating the penalty
for failing to purchase health insurance as a tax, the Court subjected it to additional
constitutional constraints.197
Some have suggested the Chief Justice’s discussions of the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses are mere dicta.198 Yet these analyses form an
essential predicate to his ultimate conclusion that the mandate could be upheld as
a tax, as some lower courts have already recognized.199 The entire Court accepted
that the most natural reading of the minimum coverage provision is as an economic
mandate adopted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.200 It was only after rejecting
the possibility that the mandate could be justified in this manner that the Chief
Justice returned to the text to see if it was susceptible to an alternative
construction.201 Thus, the only reason the Chief Justice even considered whether
the mandate could be considered a tax, the statutory text notwithstanding, is
because of his prior conclusion that the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
Proper Clause were insufficient. Thus this decision provides five firm votes for
meaningful limits on the most expansive of Congress’s powers.
The Court’s Spending Clause holding only serves to underline how NFIB
embraced a constrained vision of federal power. As noted above, NFIB marked the
first time the Court had ever held that the imposition of conditions on the receipt
of federal spending was unconstitutionally coercive.202

197.
See id. (majority opinion) (“Even if the taxing power enables Congress to impose
a tax on not obtaining health insurance, any tax must still comply with other requirements in
the Constitution.”); see also Barnett, supra note 172, at 1340 (noting that, per Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion, in order to be a tax, the payment must be small enough in relation to the cost
of health insurance to preserve the taxpayer’s ability to choose “to obey or pay”).
198.
See, e.g., David Post, Commerce Clause “Holding v. Dictum Mess” Not So
Simple, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (July 3, 2012), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/03/
commerce-clause-holding-v-dictum-mess-not-so-simple/ (“Courts don’t have to be obeyed
when they propound on something they didn’t have to propound upon for the purpose of
deciding the case the way they decided it.”).
199.
See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 370–01 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting
NFIB, 132 S. Ct at 2591) (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting NFIB held that the
individual mandate “cannot be sustained” as an exercise of the commerce power.).
200.
See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
201.
Id. (“Because the Commerce Clause does not support the individual mandate, it
is necessary to turn to the Government’s second argument: that the mandate may be upheld as
within Congress’s enumerated power to ‘lay and collect Taxes.’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §
8, cl. 1)).
202.
See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
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At issue here was the so-called Medicaid expansion, through which Congress
sought to expand Medicaid to cover all adults who were at or below 133 percent
of the poverty line.203 However, Medicaid has always been a program of
“cooperative federalism.”204 The federal government underwrites much of
Medicaid’s cost, but states implement the program.205 Administering a program of
this size and scale is not without cost, so the federal government had to make it
worth the states’ while. It did this first by promising generous amounts of funding
for states that agreed to the expansion.206 More ominously, the ACA threatened to
cut off all Medicaid funding to any state that did not go along with the
expansion.207 By leveraging state reliance on existing state funding to induce state
cooperation with the expansion, state petitioners argued, the federal government
was engaging in unconstitutional coercion of the states—and seven Justices
agreed.
In striking down the conditions imposed on the Medicaid expansion, Chief
Justice Roberts reaffirmed the five requirements of conditional spending outlined
in Dole and reiterated that Spending Clause legislation is “much in the nature of a
contract.”208 The conditions placed on the Medicaid expansion easily satisfied
most of the Dole requirements. The spending was for the general welfare, at least
as far as the term has long been understood, and did not require states to engage in
unconstitutional conduct as a condition of receiving the funds.209 The conditions
placed on the spending were also clearly related to the purpose of the spending:
increasing the availability of healthcare services to those in need.
The Medicaid expansion ran into trouble in that it arguably represented a

203.
See Huberfeld et al., supra note 168, at 12 n.55 (“The original language
established an income threshold of 133%, but that was effectively increased to 138% through a
5% income disregard in section 1004(e) of the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010.”).
204.
See Wisc. Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 485
(2002).
205.
See Leonard, supra note 102, at 400–03.
206.
See id. at 401 (“Compared to traditional federal Medicaid matching rates of 50%
to just over 73%, under the ACA the federal government will match state spending on newly
eligible beneficiaries at no less than 90%.”).
207.
Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012) (“The
threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget, in contrast, is economic
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid
expansion.”).
208.
Id. at 2602 (quoting Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
209.
United States v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 208–10 (1987).
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fundamental change in the nature of the contract between states and the federal
government. The Medicaid expansion was, in the Court’s eyes, “a shift in kind, not
merely degree.”210 Further, the sheer amount of money at stake made this effort to
leverage state reliance unduly coercive.211 As Chief Justice Roberts explained, the
federal government was doing far more than conditioning the receipt of new funds
on state willingness to comply with conditions on how those funds would be used.
Rather, Congress was leveraging state reliance on prior funding to induce states to
participate in a new program.212 There was no purpose for the condition other than
to induce compliance. Chief Justice Roberts noted that when “conditions take the
form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are
properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.”213
While recognizing that the spending power is broad, the Chief Justice also
recognized that it is not unlimited—indeed, that it cannot be unlimited without
undoing the anticommandeering principle and other previously recognized limits
on federal power.214
While the Court struck down the conditions placed on the Medicaid
expansion as going too far, it did not identify the precise point at which
constitutionally permissible pressure becomes unconstitutional coercion. Chief
Justice Roberts was explicit on this point, noting the Court had “no need to fix a
line” in this case.215 It was sufficient to note that “wherever that line may be, this
statute is surely beyond it.”216 In this manner the Court reaffirmed the need for a
limit on the federal government’s spending power, even if it could not identify
precisely where that limit was.
In rejecting both the Commerce Clause justification for the mandate and the
use of the spending power to induce state participation in the newly expanded
Medicaid program, the Court was, in effect, announcing that Congress could go as
far as it had before, but no further.217 Novel or more far-reaching assertions of
210.
211.

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
See id. at 2604 (“Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average
State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs.”).
212.
See id. at 2606 (“It is no longer a program to care for the neediest among us, but
rather an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance
coverage.”).
213.
Id. at 2604.
214.
See Bagenstos, supra note 74, at 899 (noting that both Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion and the joint dissent start with “the premise that the coercion doctrine must be
interpreted as imposing some meaningful limit” on Congress’s spending power).
215.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2606.
216.
Id.
217.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1348; see also John Valauri, Baffled by Inactivity:
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federal authority would require more persuasive justifications than had been
accepted in the past.218 In this sense, a majority of the Court sided with the
constrained vision of federal power and reaffirmed the need for limits on federal
power.219 Yet in embracing limits on federal authority, the Court did not threaten
existing federal programs or powers that have been routinely exercised since the
New Deal. Although the NFIB Court rejected the Great Society’s vision of federal
power, it did not threaten the legacy of the Great Society itself. None of the
programs enacted as part of the Great Society are constitutionally suspect as a
result of NFIB.220 What, then, are the consequences of this momentous decision?
VI. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NFIB
Before NFIB was decided, many legal commentators predicted disastrous
consequences should the constitutional challenges prevail. A conclusion that the
individual mandate exceeded the scope of federal regulatory authority would roll
back decades of federal enactments, threatening not only the Great Society, but the
New Deal as well.221 In hindsight, these arguments look nothing short of hysterical,
even if they were made by prominent constitutional authorities.
In reality, the result of the NFIB decision is not a rollback of federal law. The
decision scarcely modified the ACA. Rather, the greatest effect of the NFIB
decision is more indirect.222 The effect will not be felt on a specific statute or
existing program, as it is not clear that many programs, if any, are threatened by
the majority’s holding, particularly on the most hard-fought question of the federal
government’s power to regulate commerce. Rather, the primary effect comes from
the decision’s clear endorsement of an alternative vision of the Constitution—one
that recognizes a need for limits on federal power and that remains skeptical of
new assertions of federal authority. As Professor Laurence Solum observes, “NFIB
destabilizes what we can call the ‘constitutional gestalt’ regarding the meaning and
implications of what is referred to as the ‘New Deal Settlement.’”223 Though NFIB

The Individual Mandate and the Commerce Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 52 (2012).
218.
See Barnett, supra note 172, at 1348.
219.
See id. at 1349 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that an “unlimited
reading” of federal power would contradict the “first principles” of the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism jurisprudence).
220.
“Put another way, the expansion of congressional power authorized by the New
Deal and Warren Courts established a new high-water mark of constitutional power. Going any
higher than this, however, requires special justification.” Id. at 1348.
221.
See, e.g., Open Letter, supra note 15.
222.
Solum, supra note 9, at 2 (“[T]he most important and far-reaching legal effects
of NFIB are likely to be indirect.”).
223.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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rejects the constitutional vision dominant at the time of the Great Society’s
enactment, it does not challenge or in any way threaten the Great Society itself. It
is a vision of limitation, not of revocation.
The Court’s conclusion that a mandate to purchase federally approved health
insurance exceeds the scope of authority delegated by the Commerce Clause—
whether taken alone or in combination with the Necessary and Proper Clause—
does not directly threaten any other federal statute. This is because no other federal
statute has ever been enacted that was premised on the government’s authority to
impose such a mandated purchase on all individuals. While the federal government
enforces countless laws regulating commercial, and even some noncommercial,
activity, no other statute seeks to compel activity so that it may then be regulated.
Insofar as the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause holdings
have an effect on future cases, it may be due to the signal the Court’s decision
sends. After the Court struck down the GFSZA in Lopez, only one federal appellate
court was willing to invalidate a federal statute on Commerce Clause grounds, and
that case led to Morrison.224 After Morrison, lower federal courts remained
reluctant to join the federalism revolution.225 After Raich, the willingness of
federal appellate courts to impose meaningful Commerce Clause scrutiny on
federal statutes all but disappeared.226
By holding that the Commerce Clause could not be used to justify the
individual mandate, the Court has sent a signal to lower courts that the federalism
principles that animated the Rehnquist Court are alive and well. This does not
compel lower courts to invalidate any federal statutes, but it is likely to induce
some to consider Commerce Clause questions with an extra degree of care. Insofar
as there are some federal statutes—such as the Endangered Species Act227 or the
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr., Hate Crimes Prevention Act228—that press
the limits of federal regulatory authority, lower courts are on notice that federalism
constraints are for real.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See supra notes 84–91, 114–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 116–18 and accompanying text.
See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
GDF Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 628 (5th Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d
483, 493 (4th Cir. 2000); Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1045–46
(D.C. Cir. 1997); see also Jonathan Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal
Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377, 390–95 (2005) (discussing Endangered
Species Act cases raising Commerce Clause issues).
228.
See 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2012); see, e.g., United States v. Mullett, 868 F. Supp.
2d 618, 621–23 (N.D. Ohio 2012).
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While commentators largely focused on the Commerce Clause and on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, the Court’s treatment of the spending power is likely
to have the greatest practical effect. For years the Court has insisted that
Congress’s power to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds is limited
without ever finding a limit it would enforce. The Dole test was never particularly
stringent, at least not in application. In NFIB, however, seven Justices concluded
that Congress could not condition the receipt of existing Medicaid funds on state
acceptance of a Medicaid expansion. This put teeth into Dole’s admonition that
Congress could not use the promise of federal funds to coerce state obedience,
even if the Court did not make the basis for its conclusion fully clear.229
The Court’s decision on the Medicaid expansion dramatically reduces the
pressure for states to accept this part of the ACA. It will also limit the federal
government’s ability to direct state implementation in other areas by threatening
the withdrawal of federal funds. Given the frequency with which Congress uses
the power of the purse to induce state cooperation, new rounds of litigation on the
Spending Clause are sure to follow. Dole upheld a threat to withhold 5 percent of
federal highway funds if states refused to adopt a minimum drinking age of 21
years old.230 But would courts uphold a threat from the Environmental Protection
Agency to shut off the lion’s share of highway funds should states not adopt
sufficiently stringent pollution controls on local businesses? Perhaps not.231
NFIB is not the last word on judicially enforced federalism. It is only the
latest statement in a long-running debate over the scope of federal regulatory
authority and the role of the judiciary in enforcing whatever limits the Constitution
contains. The Court’s narrow split, particularly on the scope of the commerce
power, “leaves constitutional law in a peculiarly unsettled state.”232 The boundaries
of this holding will be challenged, and there is no doubt some of the Justices
believe the Court’s conclusion on this point was a mistake.233 While NFIB
229.
See Bagenstos, supra note 74, at 870–71; Huberfeld, et al., supra note 168, at
50–71; Bradley W. Joondeph, The Health Care Cases and the New Meaning of
Commandeering, 91 N.C. L. REV. 811, 832–36 (2013).
230.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12 (1987).
231.
See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 227, at 447–52 (arguing, before
NFIB, that these provisions are “particularly suspect under Dole”); Bagenstos, supra note 74,
at 916–20 (suggesting vulnerability of Clean Air Act highway fund sanctions after NFIB). But
see Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1003, 1054–59 (2014) (arguing highway fund sanctions remain constitutional after NFIB).
232.
See Solum, supra note 9, at 57.
233.
See Nat’l Fed. of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012)
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“As
our national economy grows and changes, we have recognized, Congress must adapt to the
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represents a triumph for a particular constitutional vision, only time will tell
whether that vision will truly take hold or whether it will be fleeting.

changing ‘economic and financial realities.’ Hindering Congress’ ability to do so is
shortsighted; if history is any guide, today’s constriction of the Commerce Clause will not
endure.” (citation omitted)).

